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The Emerging Zika Pandemic
Enhancing Preparedness
The Zika virus (ZIKV), a flavivirus related to yellow fe-
ver, dengue,WestNile, andJapaneseencephalitis, origi-
nated in the Zika forest in Uganda and was discovered
in a rhesusmonkey in 1947. Thediseasenowhas “explo-
sive”pandemicpotential,withoutbreaks inAfrica,South-
east Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas.1 Since
Brazil reported Zika virus in May 2015, infections have
occurred inat least20countries in theAmericas.2Puerto
Ricoreportedthe first locally transmitted infection inDe-
cember 2015, but Zika is likely to spread to the United
States. TheAedes speciesmosquito (anaggressiveday-
time biter) that transmits Zika virus (as well as dengue,
chikungunya, and yellow fever) occursworldwide, pos-
ing a high risk for global transmission. Modeling antici-
pates significant international spread by travelers from
Brazil to the rest of the Americas, Europe, and Asia.3
What steps are required now to shore uppreparedness
in the Americas and worldwide?
Mild Disease but Growing Concerns
AboutMicrocephaly
Zika virus infection usually is asymptomatic or causes
mild illness, such as fever, rash, muscle/joint pain, and
conjunctivitis; severe disease and fatalities are uncom-
mon. Health authorities, however, are investigating se-
vere clinical manifestations, including neurological and
autoimmune-like illness, particularly Guillain-Barré
syndrome (GBS) andcongenital neurologicalmalforma-
tions. Most concerning is a possible association be-
tween Zika virus andmicrocephaly in Brazil and, retro-
spectively, in French Polynesia.
Brazil has reported nearly 4000 cases of sus-
pectedmicrocephaly in2015, representinga20-fold in-
crease from 2010 through 2014.1 Evidence of the virus
has been found in the placenta and amniotic fluid of
mothers and in the brains of fetuses or newborns. Yet
causationbetweenZikavirusandmicrocephaly isnotyet
established. On January 15, 2016, Hawaii reported the
firstdomestic caseofmicrocephaly inanewbornwhose
motherhad lived inBrazil.Days later, Florida, Illinois, and
Texas reported several infected individuals (somepreg-
nant) after international travel.
National Health System Capacities
The International Health Regulations (IHR) requires ev-
erycountry todevelopcorehealthsystemcapacities,but
most fail tomeet international standards. Toensurena-
tional preparedness for Zika, countries—including the
UnitedStates—should fundandadopt these strategies,
particularlycountriesalreadyaffectedandthosewithsig-
nificant Aedesmosquito populations.
VectorControl.Mosquito-bornediseasesrequirere-
ducing source populations, including physical (eg, re-
movingwater-containingsources)andbiological (eg, fish
that feedon larvae)controls. Insecticidesprayingofmos-
quito habitats or adult populations can be effective. Al-
though it remains controversial due to ecological con-
cerns, releasing genetically modified sterile male
mosquitoes could reduce disease-transmitting mos-
quito larvae. All these strategies require effectivemos-
quito surveillance to ensure focused interventions.
Risk Communication. Health information cam-
paigns should advise thepublic to avoidmosquito expo-
sure, such as by wearing appropriate clothing, using in-
sect repellents,andspraying insecticide in indoorspaces.
Staying inside protected dwellings during peak mos-
quitobitinghourscanalsoreducerisk.Usingphysicalbar-
riers such as screens, closedwindows, and bed nets can
reducemosquito populations around residential areas.
Enhanced Zika Surveillance. The Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO) issued a series of epide-
miological updates and alerts in 2015 urging enhanced
surveillance for Zika virus, aswell as neurological, auto-
immune, and congenital malformation
associations.4 The IHR requires coun-
tries toreportunusualZika-relatedcases.
PAHO’s guidance prompted El Salvador
to findand report an increase inGBSbe-
tween December 2014 and January
2015. Training health workers to ob-
serve and report Zika-related disease and robust sys-
tems for collecting and analyzing surveillance data will
complement public health strategies.
Travel Advisories. To minimize harm to high-risk
travelers, agencies should consider issuing travel advi-
sories. Given rapidly evolving epidemiological and
virological data, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) issued a “level 2” Alert on
January 15 advising pregnant women to consider post-
poning travel to countries with ongoing Zika virus
transmission—the agency’s first-ever alert for pregnant
women.5 (The Public Health Agency of Canada and the
Taiwan CDC issued similar advice.) The CDC stopped
short of a more restrictive “level 3 warning” against
nonessential travel. Travel advisories for the wider
public could include guidance on reducing mosquito
exposure and greater awareness of symptoms. On
returning home, symptomatic individuals should
report their travel histories to their physician.
Since Brazil reported Zika virus in May
2015, infections have occurred in at
least 20 countries in the Americas.
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ClinicalManagement.Anestimated80%ofZika infections are
asymptomatic, andmost of the remainder are self-limited. No spe-
cificantiviral treatment isavailableandcare is supportive,withsymp-
tomsusually resolvingwithin 7 days.1 SevereGBS cases can require
intensive care, includingmechanical ventilation.On January 19, the
CDC issued new guidelines for pregnantwomenwith suspected or
provenZikavirus infection, includinganalgorithmforoffering labo-
ratory testing. (Diagnostic testing is not optimal because antibody
tests could cross-react, giving false-positive results due toother fla-
vivirus infections.)Commercial testsareunavailable,but theCDCand
several state laboratories have testing capability. Pregnantwomen
with laboratoryevidenceofZikavirus inserumoramnioticfluidshould
consider serial fetal ultrasounds every 3 to 4weeks.5
Accelerated Research and Development. When Zika infec-
tion was seen as usually asymptomatic and self-limited, research-
ers had little incentive to develop reliable countermeasures. The
emerging data on fetal complications,4 however, have altered this
equation, with research on new vaccines becoming urgent. Simi-
larly, understanding which individuals are at increased risk of GBS
could allow specific antiviral treatment.
A safe and effective Zika virus vaccine is probably 3 to 10 years
awayevenwithacceleratedresearch.TheNational InstitutesofHealth
launchedaZikavaccine initiative in late2015,andBrazilhasexpedited
vaccine development. Vaccines against yellow fever and Japanese
Bencephalitishavebeenlicensedfordecades,andBrazil,Mexico,and
the Philippines approved the first dengue vaccine in 2015.
PublicHealthEmergencyDeclarations.Anational declaration
of a public health emergency can focus political attention, while fi-
nancing a surge in resources. Public health agencies also have in-
creased authority during public health emergencies. Brazil, for ex-
ample,proactivelydeclaredapublichealthemergency inNovember
2015.4Countries experiencingmajor Zika virus outbreakswithpos-
sibleneurological, autoimmune, andcongenitalmalformationasso-
ciations could invoke heightened emergency powers.
World Health Organization Leadership
The World Health Organization (WHO) Ebola Panel in July 2015
said that urgent warnings “either did not reach senior leaders or
senior leaders did not recognise their significance.”6 By many
accounts the agency’s failure to act decisively cost thousands of
lives.7 Despite internal reforms, however, WHO is still not taking a
leadership role in the Zika pandemic. On January 18, WHO said it
is “supporting countries to control Zika,” citing the need for sur-
veillance, laboratories, vector control, and clinical care. Yet, the
global dimensions of Zika are quite clear, with fresh urgency as
the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro loom.
Despite the global threat, the WHO director-general has not
convened an IHR Emergency Committee to advise countries on
critical issues such as vector control, health system preparedness,
travel advisories, and avoiding punitive measures. An emergency
committee should be convened immediately to advise the
director-general about the conditions necessary to declare a Pub-
lic Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). The very
process of convening the committee would catalyze international
attention, funding, and research. While Brazil, PAHO, and the CDC
have acted rapidly, WHO headquarters has thus far not been pro-
active, given potentially serious ramifications.
Convening an emergency committee does not mean that the
director-general should declare a PHEIC. WHO, for example, con-
vened an emergency committee on 10 occasions to review global
data on the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Yet the
emergency committee has not advised to declare a PHEIC for
MERS but has offered detailed recommendations to guide mem-
ber states. The director-general has the sole authority under the
IHR to convene an emergency committee, and she is uniquely
empowered to declare a PHEIC subject to the committee’s
advice.
The director-general was widely criticized for waiting
4 months after the first cross-border transmission of Ebola
before declaring a PHEIC.8,9 A key lesson learned from that sear-
ing experience was the need for an intermediate-level response
to emerging crises, thus avoiding overreaction while still galvaniz-
ing global action. Functionally, the director-general could achieve
a similar result by convening an emergency committee on Zika
virus. The international community cannot afford to wait for
WHO to act.
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